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It's a question
snagging the interest of many:
Can a taxpayer lawfully exclude from
gross income contingent fees paid to an
attorney upon the resolution of litigation under
a contingent fee agreement? Over the years, federal
circuit courts of appeal have reached different conclusions
on the issue-although not always because they have
been at loggerheads about the underlying premises.
Now, the United States Supreme Court will provide
some direction when it entertains and decides
Commr v Banksl and Comm'r v Banaiis2
as part of its upcoming
October term.
29
I-
HeinOnline -- 83 Mich. B.J. 29 2004
The Germ of the Issue-
The Definition of Gross Income
At the heart of Banks/Banaitis is the comprehensive definition of
"gross income" stated in IRC 61(a):3
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all in-
come from whatever source derived including (but not limited to) the fil-
lowing items: (1) Compensation fir services, includingfes, commissions,
fringe benefits, and similar items; (2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property; (4) Interest; (5) Rents;
(6) Royalties; (7) Dividends; (8) Alimony and separate maintenance pay-
ments; (9) Annuities, (10) Income from life insurance and endowment
contracts; (11) Pensions; (12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share ofpartnership gross income; (14) Income in respect
ofa decedent; and (15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
Case law addressed to the composition of "gross income" for
federal income tax purposes confirms that "gross income" of "what-
ever kind and in whatever form paid."
" is fully taxable to the person who earns it, even in the face of
an assignment agreement4
• includes amounts paid to a taxpayer in satisfaction of the tax-
payer's obligation 5
" embraces income that is within the taxpayer's control6
* is taxable to the income receiver, even if assigned7
" can be derived "from any source whatsoever" 8
A Peripheral Issue--
Uniform Application of the Tax Laws
A peripheral issue looks to uniform application of federal tax law
throughout the states, inasmuch as some appellate courts have ap-
plied state law precepts to decide the taxability issue. The Supreme
Court has addressed the uniformity issue in several cases that may
invigorate its decision in Banks/Banaitis.9 As an example, the Court
has stated that "the constitutional requirement of uniformity is not
intrinsic, but geographic... And differences of state law, which may
bring a person within or without the category designated by Con-
gress as taxable, may not be read into the Revenue Act to spell out a
lack of uniformity."10
Upping the Ante-The Alternative Minimum Tax
The stakes of this issue changed considerably after implementa-
tion of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT).11 Under the AMT-
a system of taxation that parallels the regular income tax structure-
some typically nontaxable items are subject to tax, while some
usually allowable deductions are eliminated. In the contingent fee
context, once the IRS includes contingent fees in the taxpayer's gross
income, the taxpayer's income routinely is inflated to a level that
triggers imposition of the AMT, which allows no deduction for at-
torney fees and substantially increases tax owed. The Ninth Circuit,
in Sinyard v Comm'r, expressed its reservations with the AMT, but
ultimately viewed the matter as one for Congressional attention. 12
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Banks/Banaitis' Ancestry
The path to BankslBanaitis is strewn with a series of conflict-
ing--although some arguably not-opinions out of the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals considering whether contingent at-
torney fees must be included in a taxpayer's gross income.
Cotnam v Commr,13 a 1959 case, involved a taxpayer who sued an
estate, recovered $120,000, and paid 40 percent of that amount to
her attorneys as a contingent fee. The IRS treated the full amount of
the judgment as taxable and determined a deficiency The Fifth Cir-
cuit, which entertained the taxpayer's appeal of the Tax Court's ad-
verse decision, examined the law of the state in which the fee obliga-
tion arose, Alabama. According to the court, because the Alabama
Code provided the taxpayer's attorneys with "a lien superior to all
liens but tax liens," the taxpayer realized no taxable income with re-
spect to that portion of the award paid as attorney fees.
A different result-although using the same analysis-was ob-
tained in O'Brien v Comm'r.14 The taxpayer in this Third Circuit case
was a Pennsylvania resident who received a back-pay award in a
wrongful termination suit and was obligated to pay his attorney half
of the award under a contingent fee arrangement. The IRS, disagree-
ing with the taxpayer's "no taxable income" treatment of the attorney
fees, issued a notice of deficiency, and the taxpayer appealed the de-
ficiency to the Tax Court, which, using the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
Cotnam, reached a different conclusion applying Pennsylvania law.15
On appeal, the Third Circuit succinctly affirmed both the decision
and reasoning of the Tax Court. Note that it may well be said that
the different results in Cotnam and O'Brien did not actually manifest
a split on the "contingent fees as gross income" issue, as the courts
applied the same state law analysis to determine the outcomes.
The issue has been considered on a number of occasions after
Cotnam and O'Brien, with varied rationales and results.16
Banks and Banaitis
The taxpayer in Banks, a Michigan resident who had been em-
ployed as an educational consultant by a California entity, initiated
suit under federal provision&-against his former employer. The matter
was settled, an-dBanks paid a contiigent fee to his attorneys that he
excluded from gross income in computing his income tax liability.
Fast Facts:
SUnder the AMT, some typically nontaxable
items are subject to tax, while some usually
allowable deductions are eliminated.
Sn Banks and Banaitis the Tax Court did not
believe that a contingent fee agreement
resulted in an excludable assignment of
income from the taxpayer.
The commissioner, in his Supreme Court
submission, emphasizes that it is these
taxpayers, not the taxpayers' attorneys,
who received and control led-their awards.
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On audit, the IRS recomputed his gross income to include the at-
torney fee portion; this spawned application of the AMT, preclud-
ing Banks from taking a miscellaneous itemized deduction for the
fees. Banks challenged the IRS' deficiency in the Tax Court, which
determined that the issue turns on the collection rights of attorneys
under applicable state law (here California, the state in which the
litigation arose, which characterized the attorneys lien as "no more
than a security interest") and viewed the issue as coming squarely
within the "assignment of income" doctrine. 17 The Sixth Circuit re-
versed, rejecting the Tax Court's dependency "on the intricacies of
an attorney's bundle of rights against the opposing party under the
law of the governing state."18 The United States Supreme Court
granted the commissioner's petition for a writ of certiorari on March
29, 2004.19
In Banaitis, the taxpayer brought a wrongful discharge/tor-
tious interference with contract suit against his former employ-
ers, prevailed on both claims, and paid contingent fees to his at-
torneys. Banaitis did not include any portion of the settlement
award balance in his gross income, positing that only taxable in-
terest from the settlement must be included. The IRS recom-
puted Banaitis' federal income tax liability to include the entire
settlement proceeds within gross income, thereby increasing his
federal income tax liability by $288,798 through application of
the AMT. Banaitis filed a petition for redetermination in the Tax
Court, challenging, among other things, the inclusion, in gross
income, of attorney fees paid from the settlement under his con-
tingent fee agreement.
As in Banks, the Tax Court did not believe that a contingent fee
agreement resulted in an excludable assignment of income from the
taxpayer. The Tax Court determined that Oregon law did not pro-
vide attorneys with property interests amounting to anything more
than a common creditor's right to compensation. 20 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that under applicable Oregon law,
attorney fees are not a constituent part of gross income.21 The United
States Supreme Court granted the commissioner's petition for a writ
of certiorari on March 29, 2004, and consolidated the case with
Banks.22 The cases are scheduled to be argued on November 1, 2004.
The Lay of the Land per the Parties
In support of his assertion that contingent attorney fees are part
of a taxpayer's gross income, the commissioner, in his Supreme
Court submission, emphasizes that it is these taxpayers, not the tax-
payers attorneys, who received and controlled their awards.2 3 It mat-
ters not that the value of the taxpayers' claims and their correspond-
ing contingent fee responsibilities were uncertain at the time the
fee agreements were executed-the taxpayers nevertheless retained
the authority to determine whether, and for how much, to settle,
thereby exercising control over the amount and payment of the fee.
The relationship between taxpayer and attorney is not that of a
partner or joint venture participant, but instead is that of debtor/
creditor. Even if state law is determinative, reversal nevertheless is
required because the lower courts misinterpreted state law.
Before the Supreme Court, Banks claims that no Internal Rev-
enue Code provision specifically requires that litigation plaintiffs in-
clude contingent fees retained by, and taxed to, their attorneys.
Banks contends that he relinquished control of the contingent fee
portion to his attorney, and had no right to divest the attorney of
the fee. Banks also asserts that, because his employment daims were
brought under federal civil rights laws with fee-shifting provisions,
the contingent fees must be treated as if they had been paid under a
judgment awarding fees under the federal statutes, a characteriza-
tion that affects the identity of the income recipient. Attention
must be paid to the unjust amount of tax liability borne by the tax-
payer if the commissioner's position is adopted. Finally, Banks con-
tends that the assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable to a
contingent attorney fee contract.
In addition to the similar contentions he makes regarding as-
signments of income, Banaitis urges the Court to determine that a
contingent fee arrangement between attorney and client establishes
a joint venture or partnership. Also, contrary to Banks' position,
Banaitis submits that state law precepts should determine an attor-
ney's property interests in contingent fees.
Amici Curiae Have Their Say
Two law school professors, Gregg D. Polsky of the University of
Minnesota Law School and Brant J. Hellwig of the University of
South Carolina School of Law, filed an amici curiae brief on behalf
of the commissioner, offering a wholly new argument in favor of in-
cluding contingent fee amounts in the taxpayers' gross income. Pro-
fessors Polsky and Hellwig contend that IRC 8324 mandates tax-
ation of transfers of property in connection with the performance of
services. Whether the contingent fee arrangement entails a promise
to pay made in exchange for legal services, or transfer of a portion
of a claim in exchange for legal services, IRC 83 would require im-
position of tax that is not different in amount or timing.25
In addition to the seven other amici curiae briefs filed in support
of Banks' and Banaitis' positions is the amicus presentation of Pro-
fessor Stephen B. Cohen of the Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter, which presents a new justification for excluding contingent at-
tomey fees from a taxpayer's gross income. Under Professor Cohen's
analysis, contingent attorney fees constitute "reimbursed employee
business expenses" under IRC 62(a)(2)(A)26 that are excludable from
gross income under Treasury Regulation 1.62-2(c)(4) in accordance
with strict requirements. 27 Cohen views this treatment as consistent
with Congressional intent, as allowing for the computation of tax
liabilities that are more fair than those that result from application
of the AMT, and as having no chilling effect on the enforcement of
civil rights violations. There is a glitch-the only federal case to have
considered IRC 62(a)(2), Bieht v Commr,28 interprets the provision
as inapplicable to the expenses of a former employee.
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What Will the Supreme Court Do? the best one can hope for is that Congress will take notice of the in-
Obviously, a variety of theories have been laid at the Supreme
Court's doorstep, theories that could prompt an uncomplicated
"hands-off" resolution or a relatively complex and judicially active
determination. The Court could decide to:
Include contingent attorney fees in the taxpayer's gross
income under the assignment of Income doctrine.
This solution is attractive from the perspectives of facility, its al-
legiance to precedent, and its maintenance of uniform application
of federal tax law.
Adhere to a state-by-state analysis.
This determination certainly would have negative aspects: It
likely would spawn criticism that the Supreme Court has side-
stepped the assignment of income doctrine, and would encourage
tax-motivated contingent fee arrangements. It could even prompt
some states to legislate reductions in federal income tax liability by
giving attorneys proprietary interests in client claims. Critics would
object that this approach needlessly burdens the administrative
workload of the IRS, and diminishes tax law enforcement.
Exclude contingent attorney fees from
the taxpayer's gross income.
In the most judicially active result, the Supreme Court could rule
that contingent attorney fees are never to be included in gross in-
come, or may be excluded only in certain types of cases, e.g., cases in
which the cause of action arises under federal law. The Court could
achieve this result for many different reasons, among them (1) that
the claim, at the time the contingent fee agreement was signed, was
"an intangible, contingent expectancy;" (2) that the taxpayer's claim
was akin to a partnership or joint venture; (3) that no tax-avoidance
purpose fueled the contingent fee arrangement; or (4) that double
taxation concerns require this determination. Of course, Professors
Polsky and Hellwig's IRC 83 analysis (which is inapplicable if the
taxpayers are determined to be partners or joint venture participants)
could generate a Phyrtic victory for Banks and Banaitis, for having
prevailed on their claims that the fees are not part of gross income,
they then may be subject to an equivalent tax on the transfer.
The other legitimate (and perhaps best) reason the Supreme
Court could use to exclude contingent attorney fees from gross in-
come is that offered by Professor Cohen-that contingent attorney
fees qualify as reimbursed employee business expenses under IRC
62(a)(2)(A). IRC 83 would not apply in this context; civil rights
litigation would not be discouraged; the strict qualification re-
quirements for this exclusion would adequately safeguard against
abuse; and no established doctrine would have to be explained and
differentiated.
Whatever the outcome in Banks/Banaitis, the Supreme Court's
decision is certain to have a significant impact on taxpayers, attor-
neys, and tax professionals throughout the United States. Should
the outcome sustain the imposition of unfair tax burdens, perhaps
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Stock indexes and asset allocations are one thing. But in the end, what really
matters are the investments we make in the lives of those around us. At the
Private Client Group, we help people manage, grow and preserve their wealth.
So they can provide for those they care about most. We offer expertise in trust,
investment management, estate administration and philanthropic endeavors;
providing insightful strategies that help you achieve your goals. Take sixty
minutes to learn about us. It could be one of the best investments you'll ever
make. In Detroit, call Al Kantra at 248-901-2098; in Lansing, call Susan Schuster
at 517-334-5437; in Grand Rapids, call Tom Steele at 616-771-9152; and in
Kalamazoo, call Patrick Alyward at 269-376-1155.
Natona C
HeinOnline -- 83 Mich. B.J. 33 2004
